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ABSTRACT:   
 
In this study we utilise a non-parametric, slacks-based model (SBM) approach to analyse 
efficiency and productivity changes for Indonesian banks over the period January 2006 to 
July 2007.  Efficiency scores and Malmquist productivity indices are estimated using the 
approach for efficiency and super-efficiency estimation suggested by Tone (2001, 2002).  
Additionally, the Malmquist indices are decomposed into technical efficiency change and 
technological shift components. Using monthly supervisory data provided by Bank 
Indonesia we find that, under the intermediation approach to efficiency estimation, 
average bank efficiency was reasonably stable during the sample period, ranging between 
70% and 82%, with 92 of the 130 banks in existence at that time having efficiency scores 
of over 70%, including 10 with (super)efficiency scores above unity. We also find that 
technical efficiencies under the Intermediation approach to describing the banking 
production process are relatively stable.  Malmquist results for the industry suggest that 
the main driver of productivity growth is technological progress.  A strategy based on the 
gradual adoption of newer technology, according to our results, thus seems to have the 
highest potential for boosting the productivity of the financial intermediary operations of 
Indonesian banks.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the Asian financial crisis (AFC) in 1997/98, Indonesia has seen a complete 
transformation of its financial services industry compared with that which operated under 
the General Soeharto regime.  The AFC saw Indonesia sign a ‘Letter of Intent’ on 13th 
October 1997 with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reform the banking system 
and its operations and supervision.  That is, the country pledged that “insolvent banks 
have been closed and weak, but viable, institutions have been required to formulate and 
implement rehabilitation plans.  At the same time, steps are being taken to minimize 
future systemic risks.  In particular, the legal and regulatory environment will be 
strengthened by establishing strong enforcement mechanisms and introducing a stringent 
exit policy,” (paragraph 24).  However, given the problems surrounding the financial 
crisis, where Indonesia was the worst affected (see Jao, 2001, Chapter 2), there was no 
quick solution to overcoming the country’s inherent internal problems (Sato, 2005).1 
 Whilst the IMF was supervising the transformation of the Indonesian financial 
system up to 2003, the Indonesian government introduced the Central Bank Act (Act No. 
23) of 1999, which gave independence to Bank Indonesia.  This was then superseded by 
the 2004 amendment to the Central Bank Act of 1999 which enhanced the representation 
of and supervision by government officials, and reintroduced Bank Indonesia’s status as 
‘lender of last resort’.  Since then, the evolution of supervision and regulation has 
continued, embracing, inter alia, the introduction of deposit guarantees and the 
establishment of a Financial Stability Net (involving Bank Indonesia, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Deposit Guarantee Agency (LPS)) in March 2007.   
 Non-performing Loans (NPL) have also led to problems in Indonesian banking. 2  
The largest state-owned bank, Bank Mandiri, had a NPL ratio which increased from 7.2% 
(Sept. 2004) to 23.4% (Sept. 2005) after the introduction of the NPL Regulation No. 
7/2/P131/2005.  This regulation ensured that the credit worthiness of a debtor which had 
                                                 
1
  Indeed, Bank Central Asia, the largest Indonesian private bank, was run by the Salin family and was 
linked to corruption in lending to inter-bank markets and family or the regime’s firms.  However, in 1997, 
it was taken over by the Farallon, the San-Francisco based fund, that introduced new corporate governance 
regulations to reduce corruption that was wide-spread under the Soeharto regime. 
2
  It is interesting to note that the aggregate NPL ratio before the AFC was equal to 8.8% for all Indonesian 
banks in 1996 and, at the peak of the crisis during 1997/98, was greater than 25%. By 2005 this had fallen 
to a level of 8.8%.   
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loans from many different banks would be reflected in the same credit classification at 
each bank.  This resulted in many of the larger banks seeing their NPLs increase 
considerably, thereby reducing their earnings. For example, Bank Mandiri saw an 88% 
slide in earnings in 2005 due to the NPL regulation.  Hence, in the two years after the 
IMF restructuring programme finished, there were still many changes that could have 
distorted analysis of the banking industry in Indonesia.  However, after 2005, the changes 
were more in line with the promotion of stability and increasing the efficiency of the 
banking system and of the individual banks themselves. 
 The latter development is consistent with the aim of Bank Indonesia to see a more 
stable banking environment by reducing the number of banks in the country.  This was 
implemented in three different ways.  The first was that banks must have a minimum Tier 
I capitalisation of Rp 80 billion (US$ 8.81 billion) by 2007, increasing to Rp 100 billion 
(US$10.2 billion) by 2010; hence, many small private banks would be priced out of the 
market and would have to merge.3  Secondly, in June 2006, Bank Indonesia introduced 
the ‘single presence policy’ that prohibits investors from holding more than 25% of the 
shares of more than one bank.  This creates problems, not only for multiple holdings by 
foreign investors but also for the government itself, which owns stakes in five of the 
country’s largest banks, including Bank Mandiri, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank 
Negara Indonesia.  It is hoped that the ‘single presence policy’ will lead to further 
consolidation within the industry in the coming years.  Finally, the Financial Stability 
Net, introduced in 2007, saw a reduction in the depositor guarantee level from Rp 2 
billion to Rp 100 million (US$11,000), which covers 98% of all depositors and 38% of 
deposits.  Given the increased risk of holding cash in banks in excess of the deposit 
guarantee level it is hoped that investors will be more selective in their choice of bank, 
leading to a natural consolidation in the financial services industry in Indonesia. 
 The above discussion highlights why this study is both a timely and warranted 
analysis into the efficiency and productivity changes taking place in Indonesia during the 
most recent period of consolidation. We utilise a relatively-new, non-parametric 
modelling technique and a monthly data set compiled by Bank Indonesia – the only 
                                                 
3
  The rise in the Tier I minimum capital requirement is due to the central bank’s feeling that, presently, 50 
out of the 130 banks operating in Indonesia are too small and hence mergers are the only viable option to 
ensure the future stability of the financial system.  
 5 
previous bank efficiency analysis using monthly data that we are aware of is that 
conducted by Hadad et al. (2008) – to conduct our analysis. The paper is organised as 
follows.  In the next section, we explain our SBM efficiency methodology and the 
estimation of the Malmquist productivity indices.  Section 3 discusses the data and 
variables utilised. Section 4 presents our results and we conclude in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  NON-PARAMETRIC MODELLING METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) originated from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work 
and was later elaborated on by Charnes et al.  (1978), Banker et al.  (1984) and Färe et al.  
(1985). The objective of DEA is to construct a relative efficiency frontier through the 
envelopment of the Decision Making Units (DMUs) where the ‘best practice’ DMUs 
form the frontier.   In this study, however, we utilize a DEA model which takes into 
account input and output slacks, the so-called Slacks-Based Model (SBM), which was 
introduced by Tone (2001) and ensures that, in non-parametric modelling, the slacks are 
taken into account in the efficiency scores.  For, as Fried et al.  (1999) argued, in the 
‘standard’ DEA models based on the Banker et al.  (1984) specification “the solution to 
the DEA problem yields the Farrell radial measure of technical efficiency plus additional 
non-radial input savings (slacks) and output expansions (surpluses).   In typical DEA 
studies, slacks and surpluses are neglected at worst and relegated to the background at 
best” (page 250).   Indeed, in the analysis of public sector Decision Making Units 
(DMUs), for which DEA was originally proposed by Farrell, the idea of slacks was not a 
problem unlike when DEA is employed to measure cost efficiencies in a ‘competitive 
market’ setting.   That is, in a ‘competitive market’ setting, output and input slacks are 
essentially associated with the violation of ‘neo classical’ assumptions.   For example, in 
an input-oriented approach, the input slacks would be associated with the assumption of 
strong or free disposability of inputs which permits zero marginal productivity of inputs 
and hence extensions of the relevant isoquants to form horizontal or vertical facets.  In 
such cases, units which are deemed to be radial-or Farrell-efficient (in the sense that no 
 6 
further proportional reductions in inputs is possible without sacrificing output) may, 
nevertheless, be able to implement further additional reductions in some inputs.   Such 
additional potential input reductions are typically referred to as non-radial input slacks, in 
contrast to the radial slacks associated with DEA or Farrell inefficiency, that is, radial 
deviations from the efficient frontier.  In addition, we employ the super-efficiency SBM 
model proposed by Tone (2002). 
The measurement and analysis of productivity growth have attracted increased 
interest among researchers studying bank performance in recent years.  A Malmquist 
index of productivity change, initially defined by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) 
and extended by Färe et al., (1992) by merging it with Farrell’s (1957) efficiency 
measurement, has become increasingly popular.  However, as discussed earlier, if the 
technology is estimated using the DEA models suggested by Charnes et al.  (1978) or 
Banker et al. (1984), input and output slacks are ignored.  Hence, for the estimation of the 
Malmquist productivity index in the second part of the analysis, similar to the study of 
Liu and Wang (2008), we utilise the SBM model introduced by Tone (2001, 2002).   
In our modelling, we assume that there are n banks (DMUs) operating in the 
banking industry which convert inputs X (m × n) into outputs Y (s × n) using common 
technology T which can be characterised by the technology set Tˆ estimated using DEA: 
 
( ){ }0,1,,,ˆ ≥=≥≤∈= ∑ λλλλ XxYyyxT oo           (1) 
 
where xo and yo represent observed inputs and outputs of a particular DMU and λ  is the 
intensity variable.  Tˆ  is a consistent estimator of the unobserved true technology set 
under variable returns to scale. 
Given these conditions, the individual non-oriented efficiency for each DMU in 
period t is computed relative to the estimated frontier of period t by solving the following 
SBM linear programming problem:  
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 The performance measures for the DMU o operated in time t+1, 
))(,(ˆ 111 xTyx ttoto +++ρ  and ))(,(ˆ 1*1010 xTyx ttt +++δ , can then be obtained using models (2) and 
(3) and by changing t to t+1.  
In cases when the slacks-based performance measure of the DMU o is obtained 
relative to the frontier of another period, the following models are used, which measure 
the performance of DMU o operated in time t with respect to the frontier of time t+1: 
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When 1))(,(ˆ 1 =+ xTyx ttotoρ , we employ the following specification of the Super-
SBM model to measure the super-efficiency performance measure ))(,(ˆ 100 xTyx ttt +δ  
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The slacks-based performance measures ))(,(ˆ 11 xTyx ttoto ++ρ  and ))(,(ˆ 1010 xTyx tt ++δ  can 
then be obtained using equations (4) and (5) by interchanging t and t+1. 
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 For the second stage of the analysis, the Malmquist productivity index of the 
DMUo between periods t and t+1 is estimated as follows, in line with Färe et. al. (1992): 
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If the productivity measure, 1, +ttoM , is greater than 1, then this implies a productivity gain 
of  DMUo between period t and t+1, and, contrarily, if 1, +ttoM  is less than 1 it indicates a 
productivity loss. A 1, +ttoM  equal to 1 implies that the DMUo  has no change in its 
productivity. 
The productivity measure 1, +ttoM  can be decomposed into two indices which 
capture technical efficiency change (TECo) between the periods t and t+1, and the 
technological (frontier) change (FSo), i.e. the shift of the technology between the two 
periods: 
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           (7) 
 
 In equation (7), TECo measures the efficiency catching-up of the DMUo, which, in 
the case of TECo=1, shows that the firm is still in the same position relative to the 
efficient boundary. When TECo > 1 the firm has moved closer to the frontier, whereas if 
TECo  < 1 the firm has moved away from the frontier between two periods.  With regard 
to the FSo, which indicates the change in technology, FSo < 1 indicates a negative shift of 
the frontier (or regression), FSo > 1 a positive shift (progress) and FSo = 1 implies no shift 
in the technological frontier.  
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3.  DATA AND VARIABLES USED 
 
In modelling the Intermediation approach, we specify 3 outputs and 5 inputs, in 
line with Sealey and Lindley (1977).  The first output is ‘total loans’ (total customer loans 
+ total other lending), the second output is ‘other earning assets’ (placements in Bank of 
Indonesia + interbank assets + securities held), and the third output is ‘total off-balance-
sheet income’ (income form dividends/fees/commissions/provisions + income from 
forex/derivative transactions + securities appreciation).  The third output variable set is 
included in the analysis to reflect the fact that banks around the world have been 
diversifying, at the margin, away from traditional financial intermediation (margin) 
business and into “off-balance-sheet” and fee income business.  Hence, it would be 
inappropriate to focus exclusively on earning assets as this would fail to capture all the 
business operations of modern banks.  The inclusion of ‘total off-balance-sheet income’ 
is therefore intended to proxy the non-traditional business activities of Indonesian banks. 
The inputs estimated in the Intermediation approach are: ‘total deposits’ (demand 
deposits + saving deposits + time deposits); ‘total employee expenses’ (total salaries and 
wages + total educational spending); ‘total non-employee expenses’ (R & D + rent + 
promotion + repair and maintenance + goods and services + other costs); ‘off-balance-
sheet expenses (securities depreciation + losses from forex/derivative transactions + 
losses from commission/provisions); and ‘total provisions’ (allowances for loan losses). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
With respect to the last-mentioned input variable (i.e. ‘total provisions’), it has 
long been argued in the literature that the incorporation of risk/loan quality is vitally 
important in studies of banking efficiency.  Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), for example, 
utilising a profit function approach, include equity capital “to control, in a very rough 
fashion, for the potential increased cost of funds due to financial risk” (page. 312).  
Altunbas et al. (2000) and Drake and Hall (2003) also find that failure to adequately 
account for risk can have a significant impact on relative efficiency scores.  In contrast to 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), however, Laevan and Majnoni (2003) argue that risk 
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should be incorporated into efficiency studies via the inclusion of loan loss provisions.  
That is, “following the general consensus among risk agent analysts and practitioners, 
economic capital should be tailored to cope with unexpected losses, and loan loss 
reserves should instead buffer the expected component of the loss distribution.  
Consistent with this interpretation, loan loss provisions required to build up loan loss 
reserves should be considered and treated as a cost; a cost that will be faced with 
certainty over time but that is uncertain as to when it will materialise” (page 181).  We 
agree with this view and hence also incorporate provisions as an input/cost in the relative 
efficiency analysis of Indonesian banks. 
Summary statistics on the data are given in Table 1, where, from 2006-01 to 
2006-04, the sample includes all 131 Indonesian banks and, from 2006-05 to the end of 
our sample period, one bank dropped out of the sample leaving us with 130 banks.  In the 
estimation period, observations totalled 2,473.  However, it must be noted that separate 
frontiers were estimated for each time period to allow for comparisons with the 
Malmquist Index. 
 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 provide a summary of SBM efficiency scores for Indonesian 
banks during the time-span of the 19 months between January 2006 and July 2007 
obtained under the Intermediation approach to describing the banking production process. 
As can be seen from the table and the graph, the average efficiency/super-efficiency 
scores of Indonesian banks are relatively stable over the analysed period and range 
between 70% in April 2007 and 82% in early 2006. However, it is noteworthy that the 
least efficient banks have, to some extent, suffered a deterioration in their efficiency 
profiles – see Appendix 1 for individual bank performance.    
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
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 In Table 3, the grouping of banks by the average efficiency/super-efficiency 
scores is presented. It suggests that the majority of Indonesian banks are relatively 
efficient. Accordingly, 92 out of 130 banks have efficiency scores above 70%. This 
includes 10 banks with average efficiency/super-efficiency score above unity. The kernel 
density illustration of the average efficiency and efficiency/super-efficiency scores given 
in Figure 2 implies that the distribution of efficiency in the industry has a multi-modal 
structure.  The adjustment for the super-efficiency effect flattens the modes of the 
distribution, especially the one at about the 95% level of efficiency. However, this adds 
an additional mode at the super-efficiency level. 
     
INSERT TABLE 3 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
With respect to the second stage of the analysis, Table 4 reports the average 
Malmquist productivity index and its technical efficiency change and frontier shift 
components. The dynamics of the Malmquist index and its constituents are shown in 
Figure 3. According to Table 4 and Figure 3, the average productivity of banks gradually 
improved between January 2006 and January 2007 from 0.87 to 1.14.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
However, in February 2007, the Indonesian banking system experienced a sharp 
productivity decline with the Malmquist index falling back to 85%. Productivity 
decomposition results attribute this fall in productivity mainly to a deterioration of 
financial intermediation technology. Accordingly, the average technological efficiency of 
Indonesian banks worsened by 15% during February 2007. Although, throughout the 
considered period, technical efficiency was somewhat unchanged standing at around 
unity, in May 2007 it improved by 21%. However, the fall in technological efficiency 
offset the effect of the technical efficiency improvement on banking productivity 
resulting in a 5% overall productivity decline during this period.  
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Overall, the results suggest that the main driver of the productivity change in the 
financial intermediary activities of Indonesian banks was the improvement in their 
intermediation technology. Consequently, the pattern of the Malmquist productivity 
indices somewhat mirror the trend in technological changes. With respect to technical 
efficiency change (i.e., the catching-up effect), there appears to be a relatively stable 
pattern excepting May 2007 when the technical efficiency on average improved by 21%. 
However, substantial improvement in technical efficiency was accompanied by 
significant technological regression. This suggests that banks must gradually improve 
their intermediation technology. This strategy, according to our results, seems to have the 
highest potential for boosting the productivity of their financial intermediary operations. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this study, we have estimated efficiency scores and Malmquist productivity 
indices for Indonesian banks over the period January 2006 and July 2007 using the non-
parametric, slacks-based approach for efficiency and super-efficiency estimation 
suggested by Tone (2001, 2002) and using a unique monthly dataset provided by the 
Central Bank of Indonesia, Bank Indonesia. The results, based upon the adoption of the 
“intermediation” approach to efficiency estimation, firstly indicate that the average 
efficiency/super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks were relatively stable over the 
sample period, ranging between 70 % and 82%. 92 out of the 130 banks in existence at 
that time had efficiency scores above 70 per cent, with 10 of them having average 
(super)efficiency scores above unity, indicating that the majority of banks were relatively 
efficient. Secondly, the kernel density analysis demonstrates that the distribution of 
efficiency in the industry has a multi-modal structure. Thirdly, the Malmquist 
productivity index reveals that the average productivity of Indonesian banks gradually 
improved from 0.87 to 1.14 between January 2006 and January 2007, but then fell back 
to the 85 per cent level in February 2007, largely due to a 15 per cent deterioration in 
technological performance during February 2007. By July 2007, however, average 
productivity had recovered to 0.97. By way of contrast, the average technical efficiency 
change component of the Malmquist index was shown to be relatively stable during the 
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sample period, standing at around unity for most of the time apart from May 2007, when 
it improved by 21 per cent. Even then, however, the improvement in technical efficiency 
was insufficient to offset the technological regress experienced during that month, 
resulting in an average productivity decline of 5 per cent, as indicated by the Malmquist 
index (0.95).  
 The implications of these results for policymakers are three-hold. Firstly, the 
outliers in the efficiency ranking of the banks warrant closer examination by the 
supervisory authorities with a view to identifying the factors causing their ‘extreme’ 
performance. Bank management can then be asked to address their relative weaknesses 
and “best practice” can be disseminated throughout the banking industry, thereby 
stimulating competition and raising overall levels of bank efficiency. Secondly, the 
efficiency rankings can be used by regulators to inform the debate on bank mergers, 
which are still being sought to help stabilise the banking and financial sectors in 
Indonesia. And thirdly, identification of technological change as the main driver of 
productivity growth suggests that banks need to focus on adopting the latest technology if 
they are to raise their productivity levels.   
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Table 1. 
Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Estimation (IDR m) 
Outputs Total Loans Other Earning 
Assets 
Total Off 
Balance 
Sheet Income   
min 239 8220 0   
max 108491512 149332184 7543351   
mean 5794214.97 5901874.32 135008.74   
standard 
deviation 14277221.63 17568202.71 500953.20   
      
Inputs Total 
Deposits 
Total 
Employee 
Expenses 
Total Non-
Employee 
Expenses 
Allowance for 
Earning Asset 
Losses 
Total Off 
Balance 
Sheet 
Expenses 
min 4196 129 32 76 0 
max 197438261 4878933 2445929 18031253 7276712 
mean 9441324.11 166411.63 80226.68 358925.62 67694.92 
standard 
deviation 25789582.27 3040490.05 264319.48 1575706.56 433709.97 
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Table 2. 
Summary of efficiency and super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks (January 2006 – July 2007) 
Bank 2006-
01 
2006-
02 
2006-
03 
2006-
04 
2006- 
05 
2006-
06 
2006-
07 
2006-
08 
2006-
09 
2006-
10 
2006-
11 
2006-
12 
2007-
01 
2007-
02 
2007-
03 
2007-
04 
2007-
05 
2007-
06 
2007-
07 
Mean 
efficiency 
and super-
efficiency 
scores 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.78 0.79 
Mean 
efficiency 
scores 
0.79 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.78 0.79 
Minimum 0.29 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.11 
Maximum 
of super-
efficiency 
scores 
2.15 1.51 1.42 1.15 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.21 1.16 1.21 1.14 1.18 1.12 1.22 1.19 
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Figure 1. 
Efficiency Summary Scores for Indonesian Banks: January  2006 – July 2007 
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N.B.: ‘Mean Eff & S-Eff’, ‘Mean Eff’ and ‘Maximum S-Eff’ respectively denote the mean of the efficiency and super-
efficiency scores, the mean of the efficiency scores and the maximum of the super-efficiency scores. ‘Minimum’ 
represents the minimum of the efficiency scores. 
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Table 3. 
Average SBM efficiency Scores for Indonesian Banks by Efficiency Levels  
 
Average efficiency/super-
efficiency scores  
Number 
of banks 
Banks 
1.00 and over 10 didi, iidi, iibr, iirr, iddp, idai, idhr, irsb, iipi, ipsp 
Over 0.90 and less than 1.00 32 iihp, ihib, iiar, didb, ippa, iqar, idpb, iiqa, irrb, iiaa, 
iipp, dqip, iipb, idpi, iirb, iiqb, iira, iibi, ipap, idir, 
iaia, ddii, iiir, iimi, diqr, iqib, ipqr, iiqr, idap, iiap, 
iihb, iiba 
Over 0.80 and less than 0.90 24 iqma, ddpr, idrp, ihdr, iqrb, disb, diib, idpa, ipsb, 
iphb, ipai, disa, idsb, iibb, irda,ipbi, ddhb, idmr, 
ipba, iqpp, idia, iphi, ihhp, idii 
Over 0.70 and less than 0.80 26 dqia, disi, ipab, iimr, idri, ihir, ipsr, ddpp, iihi, ipar, 
dihi, drqr, idpp, ipbr, ihdi, idqa, dibb, iphp, ipqa, 
ipmi, ipma, ddda, ipsa, ihhr, dimb, ihpb 
Over 0.60 and less than 0.70 15 Ippr, iisb, diii, ipsi, ipmp, diaa, iisi, dddi, dima, ihpr, 
ipha, dqii, ihhb, dihr, diab 
Over 0.50 and less than 0.60 15 Iqra, iphr, ippb, ddhr, idqr, ipbp, iqqp,dirr, iimb, 
ipbb, ipaa, ipqb, iqmp, iapr, ihpp 
Less than 0.50 8 Iahi, iddr, idqi, drqa, ddhp, irar, iqhb, ddpi 
N.B. Letters are used to identify the banks to preserve their anonymity.  
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Figure 2. 
Distributions of Average Individual Efficiency and Super-Efficiency Scores for 
Indonesian Banks: January  2006 – July 2007 
 
 
N.B.: ‘Eff’ and ‘Eff & S-Eff’ respectively denote efficiency and efficiency/super-efficiency scores. The 
vertical axis refers to the (estimated) probability density function of the distribution of efficiency/super-
efficiency scores and the horizontal axis refers to the efficiency/super-efficiency scores. We use the 
Gaussian kernel density. The bandwidths are obtained using the Sheather and Jones (1991) ‘solve-the-
equation’ plug-in-approach.  
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Table 4. 
Average Slacks-Based Malmquist Productivity Index and its Components  
for Indonesian Banks During January 2006 – July 2007  
 
2006-
01/ 
2006-02 
2006-
02/ 
2006-03 
2006-
03/ 
2006-04 
2006-
04/ 
2006-05 
2006-
05/ 
2006-06 
2006-
06/ 
2006-07 
2006-
07/ 
2006-08 
2006-
08/ 
2006-09 
2006-
09/ 
2006-10 
MI 0.866 0.908 0.949 0.961 0.962 0.977 0.990 0.991 0.983 
TEC 1.021 1.036 1.011 0.996 0.948 1.031 1.012 0.986 1.000 
FS 0.852 0.904 0.948 0.972 1.044 0.953 0.981 1.012 0.988 
          
 
2006-
10/ 
2006-11 
2006-
11/ 
2006-12 
2006-
12/ 
2007-01 
2007-
01/ 
2007-02 
2007-
02/ 
2007-03 
2007-
03/ 
2007-04 
2007-
04/ 
2007-05 
2007-
05/ 
2007-06 
2007-
06/ 
2007-07 
MI 0.994 1.038 1.135 0.849 0.949 0.963 0.954 0.963 0.973 
TEC 0.995 1.008 0.993 1.023 1.009 0.929 1.211 0.997 1.026 
FS 1.003 1.036 1.165 0.845 0.955 1.085 0.837 0.990 0.953 
N.B.: MI, TEC and FS respectively denote Malmquist Index, Technical Efficiency Change and Technological 
Change (i.e. frontier shift). 
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Figure 3. 
Dynamics of Indonesian Bank Efficiency: Malmquist Representation. 
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N.B.: MI, TEC and FS respectively denote Malmquist Index, Technical Efficiency Change and Technological 
Change (i.e. frontier shift). 
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Appendix 1. Individual efficiency and super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks (January 2006 – July 2007) 
 
Bank 2006-01 
2006-
02 
2006-
03 
2006-
04 
2006- 
05 
2006-
06 
2006-
07 
2006-
08 
2006-
09 
2006-
10 
2006-
11 
2006-
12 
2007-
01 
2007-
02 
2007-
03 
2007-
04 
2007-
05 
2007-
06 
2007-
07 Average 
iiir * 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.81 0.86 1.00 0.99 0.95 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.87 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.93 0.94 
iidi 2.15 1.51 1.42 0.94 1.20 1.20 0.91 1.21 1.03 0.67 0.82 1.10 0.99 1.06 1.14 1.01 0.99 1.22 1.19 1.15 
iipi * 1.08 1.06 0.98 1.04 1.05 1.05 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.96 1.01 1.01 0.96 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.97 1.00 
iipp * 0.90 0.82 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.03 1.01 0.93 1.02 0.96 1.01 1.01 0.97 
iipb * 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.95 0.97 
iihi * 0.98 0.78 0.94 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.93 0.84 0.97 0.95 0.82 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.76 
iihp * 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.03 0.94 0.98 1.02 0.98 0.96 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.02 0.94 0.92 0.99 1.00 0.99 
iihb * 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.88 0.90 
iiap * 0.89 0.99 0.98 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.85 0.96 0.77 0.85 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.91 0.91 
iiaa 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.01 0.95 0.88 0.95 0.97 0.84 0.98 
iiar * 0.96 0.91 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.97 0.98 
iisi * 0.91 0.83 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.55 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.57 0.65 
iisb 0.98 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.66 0.73 0.77 0.71 0.66 0.68 
iibi * 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.91 1.01 0.76 0.92 0.80 0.91 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.95 
iiba  0.97 0.73 0.76 0.91 0.97 0.78 0.68 0.96 1.01 0.94 1.02 0.84 1.01 0.87 0.84 0.88 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.90 
iibb 0.73 1.00 0.70 0.82 0.88 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.84 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.65 0.94 0.98 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.84 
iibr 1.17 1.03 1.02 1.06 1.04 1.09 1.07 0.90 1.01 1.05 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.21 1.10 0.67 1.10 0.98 1.09 1.04 
iimi 0.91 0.97 0.86 0.87 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.94 0.89 0.87 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.93 
iimb * 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.63 0.73 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.56 
iimr * 0.64 0.82 0.71 0.90 0.72 0.63 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.68 0.69 0.88 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.79 0.78 
iira 0.94 0.88 0.93 1.02 1.04 0.88 0.99 1.01 0.97 0.90 0.91 1.00 0.92 1.01 1.02 0.96 1.02 0.86 1.00 0.96 
iirb 1.03 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.88 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.84 0.99 0.94 0.95 0.97 
iirr 1.04 1.05 0.97 1.05 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.03 0.99 1.04 0.97 1.02 
iiqa 1.03 1.10 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.03 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.91 0.94 0.98 
iiqb 0.92 0.97 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.91 1.01 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.96 1.01 0.96 
iiqr 1.05 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.82 0.81 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.71 1.00 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.80 0.73 0.92 
idii 1.05 0.99 0.77 0.65 0.56 0.50 0.49 0.60 0.70 0.69 0.63 0.71 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.97 0.80 
idia 0.76 0.84 0.63 0.78 0.84 0.68 0.73 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.89 1.02 0.96 0.91 1.03 1.01 0.81 
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Appendix 1. Individual efficiency and super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks (January 2006 – July 2007) (continued) 
Bank 2006-01 
2006-
02 
2006-
03 
2006-
04 
2006- 
05 
2006-
06 
2006-
07 
2006-
08 
2006-
09 
2006-
10 
2006-
11 
2006-
12 
2007-
01 
2007-
02 
2007-
03 
2007-
04 
2007-
05 
2007-
06 
2007-
07 Average 
idir 0.89 1.05 0.87 1.02 1.00 1.01 0.88 0.86 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.96 1.16 0.64 1.00 0.95 1.03 0.86 1.00 0.95 
iddp 0.88 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.06 1.12 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.01 
iddr 0.29 0.18 1.00 0.34 0.17 0.31 0.41 0.33 0.26 0.33 0.42 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.70 0.71 0.46 
idpi 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.96 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.88 0.90 0.97 
idpp 1.00 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.73 
idpa 0.78 0.91 0.97 0.76 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.84 0.80 0.78 1.01 0.99 0.93 0.76 0.93 0.87 
idpb 1.04 0.92 0.78 1.01 0.98 1.02 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.04 0.89 0.88 1.05 0.98 0.82 1.03 1.03 0.98 
idhr 1.03 1.08 1.10 0.87 1.03 1.05 1.03 0.91 0.96 0.98 1.01 0.94 1.08 0.95 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 
idai 1.05 1.06 0.99 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.98 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 
idap 0.94 1.04 0.68 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.95 0.97 0.44 1.00 1.01 0.96 0.92 
idsb * 0.78 0.82 0.97 0.84 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.99 0.73 0.81 0.85 0.94 0.84 0.86 0.99 0.89 0.85 
idmr 0.86 0.89 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.82 0.74 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.83 
idri 0.73 0.76 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.86 0.70 0.78 0.81 0.50 0.76 0.84 0.99 0.77 
idrp 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.89 
idqi 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.41 
idqa * 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.79 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.98 0.67 0.76 0.72 0.93 0.72 
idqr * 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.98 0.46 0.91 0.95 0.72 0.71 0.58 
ippa 0.91 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.95 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 
ippb 0.66 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.63 0.62 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.55 0.59 
ippr 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.66 0.72 0.71 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.69 
iphi 0.94 0.84 0.88 0.93 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.99 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.74 0.85 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.74 0.66 0.67 0.81 
iphp 0.97 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.71 
ipha 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.68 0.60 0.65 0.63 
iphb 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.96 0.75 0.81 0.97 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.87 0.73 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.86 
iphr 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.57 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.59 
ipai 0.72 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.97 0.86 0.79 0.99 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.86 
ipap 0.87 0.96 0.94 1.01 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.95 
ipaa 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 
ipab 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.87 0.71 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.96 0.93 0.78 
ipar 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.75 
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Appendix 1. Individual efficiency and super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks (January 2006 – July 2007) (continued) 
Bank 2006-01 
2006-
02 
2006-
03 
2006-
04 
2006- 
05 
2006-
06 
2006-
07 
2006-
08 
2006-
09 
2006-
10 
2006-
11 
2006-
12 
2007-
01 
2007-
02 
2007-
03 
2007-
04 
2007-
05 
2007-
06 
2007-
07 Average 
ipsi 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.68 
ipsp 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.13 0.93 0.94 0.91 1.03 1.00 0.95 1.00 
ipsa 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.90 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.82 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.70 
ipsb 0.74 0.83 0.81 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.84 0.93 0.81 0.79 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.86 
ipsr 0.78 0.84 0.78 0.87 0.87 0.73 0.84 0.87 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.73 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.69 0.64 0.68 0.76 
ipbi 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.96 0.94 0.80 0.89 0.82 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.88 0.86 0.79 0.84 
ipbp 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.56 0.57 
ipba 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.86 0.79 0.85 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.85 0.92 0.87 0.82 
ipbb 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.56 
ipbr 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.98 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.71 1.00 0.69 0.98 0.73 
ipmi 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.62 0.71 0.80 0.82 0.71 
ipmp 0.71 0.65 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.42 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.65 
ipma* 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.93 0.78 0.83 0.70 
ipqa * 0.78 0.82 0.78 0.84 0.74 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.65 0.62 0.71 
ipqb * 0.57 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.53 0.57 0.45 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.55 
ipqr 0.83 1.00 0.88 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.88 0.94 0.89 0.96 0.90 1.00 0.93 
ihib 0.93 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 
ihir 0.83 0.95 0.86 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.74 0.80 0.76 0.64 0.95 0.68 0.54 0.50 0.44 0.98 0.88 0.79 0.77 
ihdi 0.70 0.69 0.90 0.74 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.74 0.73 0.77 0.72 
ihdr 0.74 0.92 0.86 0.93 0.82 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.80 0.80 0.93 0.83 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.88 
ihpp 0.46 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.38 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.50 0.50 
ihpb 0.66 0.56 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.64 0.80 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.58 1.00 0.51 0.56 0.70 
ihpr 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.64 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.47 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.64 
ihhp 0.76 0.85 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 1.00 0.87 0.84 1.00 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.45 0.88 0.74 0.79 0.81 
ihhb 0.53 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.51 0.64 0.72 0.52 0.45 0.43 0.29 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.60 
ihhr * 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.71 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.67 0.63 0.59 0.71 0.62 0.54 0.70 
iaia 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.75 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.95 
iapr 0.59 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.39 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.64 0.56 0.55 0.48 0.99 0.83 0.99 0.54 
iahi 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.42 0.52 0.55 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.49 
irda 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.99 0.96 0.80 0.92 0.97 0.91 0.73 0.95 0.67 0.37 1.00 0.99 0.88 0.83 0.77 0.75 0.84 
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Appendix 1. Individual efficiency and super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks (January 2006 – July 2007) (continued) 
 
Bank 2006-01 
2006-
02 
2006-
03 
2006-
04 
2006- 
05 
2006-
06 
2006-
07 
2006-
08 
2006-
09 
2006-
10 
2006-
11 
2006-
12 
2007-
01 
2007-
02 
2007-
03 
2007-
04 
2007-
05 
2007-
06 
2007-
07 Average 
irar 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.38 
irsb * 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.96 1.01 1.00 1.00 
irrb * 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.92 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 
iqib 0.91 0.91 0.73 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.87 1.00 0.93 
iqpp 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.54 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.80 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.82 
iqhb 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.27 0.31 
iqar 0.98 0.99 0.96 1.00 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
iqmp 0.72 0.57 0.58 0.48 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.42 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.47 0.69 0.76 0.46 0.54 
iqma 1.00 0.73 0.60 0.89 0.92 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.77 0.60 1.00 0.98 0.82 0.99 0.96 0.89 
iqra 0.59 0.62 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.50 0.59 
iqrb 0.81 0.79 0.98 0.89 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.84 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.39 0.61 0.91 0.98 0.87 
iqqp 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.61 0.69 0.62 0.78 0.76 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.47 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.57 
diii 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.55 0.38 0.56 0.93 0.95 0.68 
diib 1.04 1.01 0.80 0.96 0.90 0.79 1.00 0.94 0.67 0.86 0.82 0.60 0.88 0.83 0.92 0.63 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.87 
didi 1.14 1.15 1.18 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.19 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.21 1.15 1.02 1.10 1.08 1.12 1.11 1.06 1.16 
didb 0.82 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 
dihi 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.76 0.83 0.61 0.73 0.70 0.42 0.69 0.85 0.88 0.75 
dihr 0.72 0.76 0.85 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.63 0.91 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.39 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.36 0.43 0.60 
diaa 0.69 0.74 0.68 0.66 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.89 0.78 0.75 0.65 0.66 0.73 0.43 0.33 0.56 0.34 0.38 0.65 
diab 0.74 0.66 0.82 0.71 0.87 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.57 0.59 0.50 0.60 
disi 0.78 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.64 0.74 0.67 0.48 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.79 
disa 0.90 1.01 0.97 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.42 0.37 0.92 0.38 0.37 0.85 
disb 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.82 0.86 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.77 0.75 0.62 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.71 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.87 
dibb 0.78 0.85 0.87 0.98 0.89 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.67 0.69 0.47 0.68 0.64 0.28 0.36 0.65 0.60 0.71 
dima 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.53 0.87 0.26 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.51 0.39 0.55 0.48 0.47 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.64 
dimb 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.76 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.72 0.65 0.56 0.52 0.42 0.64 0.71 0.77 0.70 
dirr 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.47 0.41 0.57 0.67 0.62 0.28 0.55 0.51 0.42 0.56 
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Appendix 1. Individual efficiency and super-efficiency scores of Indonesian banks (January 2006 – July 2007) (continued) 
Bank 2006-01 
2006-
02 
2006-
03 
2006-
04 
2006- 
05 
2006-
06 
2006-
07 
2006-
08 
2006-
09 
2006-
10 
2006-
11 
2006-
12 
2007-
01 
2007-
02 
2007-
03 
2007-
04 
2007-
05 
2007-
06 
2007-
07 Average 
diqr 0.95 0.90 0.96 0.81 0.85 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.88 0.97 0.98 1.04 1.00 0.93 0.89 0.98 1.00 0.83 0.93 
ddii 1.01 1.01 0.86 0.97 0.86 0.84 1.00 0.99 0.84 0.97 0.85 0.96 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.94 1.01 0.97 1.00 0.95 
dddi 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.64 0.67 0.44 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.65 
ddda 0.61 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.59 0.77 0.74 0.80 0.70 
ddpi * 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.19 
ddpp 0.72 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.90 0.85 0.73 0.83 0.60 0.56 0.47 0.94 0.52 0.26 0.96 0.84 0.97 0.76 
ddpr 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.46 0.79 0.93 0.61 0.89 
ddhp 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.32 0.49 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.39 
ddhb * 0.75 0.75 0.76 1.00 0.87 0.79 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.72 0.71 0.87 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.98 0.78 0.83 0.95 0.84 
ddhr 0.61 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.44 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.58 
drqa 0.51 0.64 0.72 0.41 0.46 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.41 
drqr 0.57 0.69 0.78 0.98 0.99 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.54 0.55 0.97 0.79 1.01 1.03 1.03 0.77 1.01 0.74 
dqii 0.66 0.73 0.82 0.68 0.64 0.49 0.60 0.63 0.48 0.85 0.52 0.66 0.56 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.90 0.62 0.57 0.63 
dqip 1.02 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.99 1.01 0.56 1.01 1.01 1.18 0.83 1.09 1.16 0.97 
dqia 0.79 1.01 0.94 0.97 0.87 0.99 0.95 0.72 0.73 0.66 0.69 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.66 0.53 0.83 0.62 0.91 0.79 
 
N.B.: *Banks listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). 
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